The Future of U.S. - India Relations

1:00 P.M. EDT 

 

MODERATOR: Welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center. Today we have Evan Feigenbaum who most of you already know. He, of course, is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs at the State Department. And he also co-chaired the [Department’s coordinating team for the] Civil Nuclear Agreement. And what he’s going to do – he’s going to start off with a few comments and then we will open it up to questions.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: All right, good. Well, thanks for coming. Nice to see all of you again. We just came through this very interesting period, where we’ve concluded this very historic civil nuclear agreement between the United States and India. But more than that, we’ve come through a very historic period, I think, in U.S.-India relations. And so you and I, and our colleagues in government and in the media and in business, have been witness over the last several years to what I think of as really a transformational moment in the U.S.-India relationship. Years and years from now, people are going to look back—and historians are going to look back—at this period and they’re going to regard it in a very transformational way.

And I should say that this transformation goes back to the 1990s, as you all know. It’s really transcended politics. It’s transcended partisanship. You see this in the overwhelming bipartisan majorities both for the Hyde Act and the vote for the recent U.S.-India civil nuclear bill.

So we thought as the United States approaches an election now in, what, about 18 days, and as India is going to approach an election by next spring, that it was a good time to have me come over and just reflect a little bit on the big picture in U.S.-India relations: where we’ve been, where we are, and where we have the potential to go, what’s been achieved over the last several years – to look forward to what’s to come in the next administration.

So maybe I’ll just say three things at the outset: I’ll just say something brief about the conceptual architecture of U.S.-India relations, at least as I see it. And second, I’ll say something operational about things that are happening in the relationship that I think are going to carry over into the next administration. And then, if you want, I’ll say something about the civil nuclear deal, and what’s next – because we’re done, but, of course, we’re looking forward to the initiation of civil nuclear trade now between the United States and India.

On the conceptual: As I said, it’s an absolutely transformational moment in the relationship. And to those of you who’ve followed U.S.-India relations for a long time, you know that if you look back really not very far into history—just 12 or 13 years—there was a time in the United States when people tended not to think about India very much at all, especially in elite American foreign policy opinion. And when they did think about India, they thought about it really in the very narrow context of South Asia – and usually hyphenated with Pakistan. So everything was Indo-Pak this or Indo-Pak that: Indo-Pak nuclear balance, Indo-Pak force balance, Indo-Pak relations. And that’s really changed – and it’s changed over a period of about 12 or 13 years, but especially in recent years.

And I think the change has a lot to do with what’s happened in India: the emergence of India as a global player economically, adaptation in Indian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. But it also has a lot to do with what’s happened in the United States. And to crystallize that, I’d say just that American foreign policy opinion increasingly, I think, begins with the premise that we don’t live in 1948, much less 1958 or 1968. And so there’s been an effort across the political spectrum in the United States to adapt American foreign policy thinking to the realities of the world that we live in today. And the simple fact is that the realities of power and capacity in the world of 2008 are not the realities of power and capacity in the world of 1948.

And I’ll just give you an example that I like to give: Take something like the International Energy Agency, you know, which was an institutional creation from the 1970s that came out of the last big oil price shock. It wasn’t so much a consumer answer to OPEC, but it was, nonetheless, an effort by the major consumers to get together and coordinate a little bit.

The International Energy Agency doesn't include China and India. So ask yourself rhetorically: What kind of International Energy Agency doesn’t include the two fastest-growing energy consumers in the world?

And so the United States has been at the forefront of trying to adapt these kinds of institutions, not least by encouraging greater outreach to India and from India – but also, we hope, eventually Indian membership in the IEA, and for that matter, Chinese membership in the IEA.

So both in the sense of a very formal architecture, but also the fact that as we look around at a whole series of problems globally—whether it’s fighting poverty, or it’s dealing with terrorism, or it’s concluding a successful trading round, or it’s dealing with climate change—we increasingly look at countries like India as potential partners on these things at a global level in ways that I think American elite foreign policy opinion just didn’t a little over a decade ago. So there’s been a transformation in the way the United States looks at India because of the way we’ve begun to think about the challenges in today’s world. And I think—and you all know this better than I do—there have been some changes in Indian foreign policy, too.

There’s also been a change because of what’s happened bilaterally, which is that I like to say that the U.S.-India relationship is one of these relationships that moves forward sometimes in spite of government. There are a lot of things that are happening at the government-to-government level that are very exciting; but what’s really dynamic and what’s really driving this relationship are the ties between business people, between students and scholars and citizens: We have 84,000 Indian students in the United States, which is more than from any country in the world. We have nearly three million Indian-Americans who’ve just played a very important role in helping us to conclude the Civil Nuclear Initiative.

So these people, and these contacts, form a kind of “living bridge,” a very human bridge between our two countries. And I think that’s unique in a lot of ways because, you know, in a lot of ways, those are our most mature partnerships – and you can’t say this about all of our relationships.

But you can’t say that about all of India’s relationships either. And if you look at things like the India-Russia relationship, for instance, it’s really dominated by the government-to-government relationship. There’s less going on in the private sector than there is between the United States and India.

So as exciting as the government-to-government relationship has been between the U.S. and India, I think the real dynamism—and the real excitement—comes out of the private sector. And that’s what’s driving the relationship. And that’s going to carry us through to the next Administration as well.

It’s also an overwhelmingly bipartisan relationship in both countries. And so this transformation has its roots in the 1990s, when both countries were governed by different political parties. And so when India made the transformation to the UPA government, when we made the transformation to the Bush Administration a little bit earlier, you’ve had really a solid core of opinion in both countries that transcends politics, transcends partisanship. And I would expect that’s going to continue. And I think that was reflected in these overwhelming votes [for the civil-nuclear bill] that you just saw a few weeks ago: the 298-117 [in the House], the 86-13 in the Senate.

So that’s a little bit on the conceptual, and we can talk about any of this if you’d like.

On the operational: It’s a very multidimensional relationship now. We do a lot of things together. Trade? India is one of our fastest growing export markets. I think trade – the last period that I’ve seen data, which was 2004 to 2007, the last three-year span – two-way trade in goods and services nearly doubled, from just under 30 billion to just under 60 billion. It’s not of China-like proportions; we have a $320 billion trading relationship with China. But the trajectory is very clear. It’s overwhelmingly positive. And it’s important to note how rapidly it’s expanded. India, as I said, is also a very fast growing export market for the United States.

The two most interesting things about trade to me are: It’s not just American investment into India; now you have Indian FDI into the United States, including branded Indian investments. So whether it’s Essar, you know, buying Minnesota Steel, or it’s small- and medium-sized enterprises that came with this FICCI [Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry] delegation for the small- and medium size enterprises summit. It’s not just the big boys; it’s also small- and medium-sized companies. It’s both directions. It’s investment in both directions. So that’s going to continue to grow, and it’s not just in high-tech or in software anymore.

We’d like to do more on agriculture: We’ve had this very successful Agricultural Knowledge Initiative, but it’s ending its [allotted] period: it was a three-year vision, and so that three-year period is coming to an end. I know the Prime Minister has a vision of a second Green Revolution in India. And that is a legacy of the relationship between the United States and India that’s overwhelmingly positive, even from a period in the past when we had a much more strained relationship. So we’d like to find a way to do more on agriculture. And I’m sure the next administration will be committed to that, too. And by that, I don’t just mean the science of agriculture; I mean the economics of agriculture as well – you know, moving goods from farm to market, getting supply chains, cold chains, these kinds of things right. And both the U.S.-India Business Council and others have been very active on this.

There are exciting things happening on defense: We have two American companies bidding for the Multi-Role Combat Fighter aircraft competition, Boeing and Lockheed. All of our services exercise with Indian services now. You may have seen that the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, is in India today. He was up in Siachen I saw in the newspaper this morning. So exciting things are happening on defense.

Things happening in education: We’ve just signed a new Fulbright agreement that has the potential really to double the size of the program because, you know, it’ll involve Indian and American co-funding of the program. I think we’re calling it now the “Fulbright-Nehru” program instead of just the Fulbright program, so it’s more of a genuine partnership between the two countries in which the two governments work together on this.

And there is a lot happening in other areas, too.

And of course, you all know about the nuclear area. So finally there’s this nuclear agreement, which I think in a lot of ways removed the principle obstacle to stronger U.S.-India relations for a long time.

And you don’t have to go back very far into history to recognize how important this was to India, and how important it was to remove the obstacle to the relationship. And we did it for all of the reasons you’re familiar with: Some are strategic. Some are environmental. Some are economic – in both India and globally. And of course, there are what we see as the nonproliferation benefits of the Initiative.

We’re very proud of this achievement. We think Indians and Americans both should take pride in it. Frankly, the two governments worked together on this Initiative as we had never worked together before. So we’ve also built a platform of trust and sustained engagement between our two countries that I certainly hope will translate into enhanced cooperation on other things over time. Congress passed the bill. The President signed the bill. You may have been there when Secretary Rice and Minister Mukherjee signed the 123 Agreement.

So now we look forward to the remaining steps. And these tend to be more technical and bureaucratic, so they don’t get much press, and maybe they shouldn’t get much press, but – because they’re not as interesting to readers as the big, strategic picture. But essentially, you know, we’re looking forward to India bringing its safeguards agreement with the IAEA into force. We have a couple more certifications that we’ll have to make prior to licensing beginning – and you can see these in the bill. The President also has to make a couple of certifications before we exchange diplomatic notes to bring the 123 Agreement into force. So there are some certifications that have to be made before entering into force, and then also prior to licensing.

And then there is the opportunity now for discussion between the Indian nuclear industry and the world: American firms, French firms, Russian firms and others. And I expect that American industry will be a big part of that. I’ve heard that the U.S.-India Business Council may be leading a delegation from our nuclear industry to India. That’s an exciting thing. And it’s not just reactors – it’s services, and it’s other things, too.

But this is historic in a lot of ways. It’s important, I think, for all of the reasons that the Prime Minister and the President have said. It has vast implications for nonproliferation, for energy, for economics. But it’s also reflective—and this is the last thing I’d say—of a different kind of interaction between the two countries. We’ve learned a lot doing this Initiative. We’ve learned a lot about each other as governments. We’ve come to work together to overcome challenges in a way that I think the two governments never had to before.

So we’ve come, as I said at the beginning, through a very historic period in the relationship. And we’re all going to look back on this period, I think, as absolutely transformational. Just as the last administrations in the United States and in India really set the table for these two administrations to make – to take the relationship to the next level, I think the completion of the Civil Nuclear Initiative, but also all of these other things that are happening, really set the stage for the next two governments in both countries, whoever they may be, to enhance the relationship even further and to build a real strategic partnership between our countries. And by that, I mean a relationship that is not just bilateral, is not just focused on South Asia, but really “goes global” – where we build a real global partnership together to work on a whole range of challenges around the world that no one nation can solve working alone, whether it’s terrorism, or it’s concluding a successful trade round, or it’s dealing with nonproliferation, or other things.

So that’s what we’ve been up to. And I expect that’s what the next administrations in both countries will be up to. So, happy to talk about anything you’d like to talk about but that gives you a little bit of an overview, at least as I see it.

So, please.

QUESTION: If I heard right, Doris said you co-chaired the nuclear team. I mean, you started by saying that – what does that mean, co-chair?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: We had a coordinating group within the State Department. And it was charged with moving the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Initiative through the IAEA Board of Governors, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and to the Congress. And so I was the co-chair of that group with a colleague from the nonproliferation side of our Department.

So we had a team of people from six bureaus of the Department: lawyers, South Asia people, nonproliferation people, people from Under Secretary Burns’ staff, Acting Under Secretary Rood’s staff – coordinating with the Department of Energy, the NSC. So what we had is a real team effort. I think Ambassador Mulford has mentioned this to you before –

QUESTION: Yes, yes, yes.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: We were kind of the coordinating team that –

QUESTION: I got the impression that it was bilateral.

FEIGENBAUM: No. No, but to be honest, we worked very closely with the Indian Government. So, you may know that we were always flying off to Vienna and coordinating with Mr. Menon and Mr. Saran and Dr. Grover. And I worked very closely with Mr. Menon’s chief of staff. And so it was a real team effort, I think, in both countries individually and then collectively as well. And we got it done.

QUESTION: As far as this deal is concerned, I understand China and Pakistan are not happy, and now Pakistan’s president is in China to have the same deal or buy more reactors and all – extra and all that.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, I don’t know if I’d characterize them as “unhappy.” I mean, Pakistan and China are both members of the IAEA Board of Governors. They both joined the consensus of the 35 countries. China is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and China was also part of that 45-country consensus. So, you know, both of them, in the end, played an important role in moving this thing forward because they didn’t block the consensus and they were part of this international effort. We’ve always said that, from our vantage point, this is an India-specific exception.

QUESTION: But U.S. said they [Pakistan] go ahead with the same deal with China. You think there is some kind of confusion for (inaudible). What consideration, all of that?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: No, I’m not aware that they’re looking to move forward with this kind of deal. I mean, China has a history at Chashma, of course, of providing reactors to Pakistan that predates the U.S.-India nuclear deal, by the way. So we’ve always said this is an India-specific exception.

In terms of what China is thinking or Pakistan is thinking, I can’t get inside their head. I mean, I’m not surprised that Mr. Zardari is in China. Pakistan and China have a longstanding diplomatic and strategic relationship, so it seems to me there’s a lot on their plate.

QUESTION: And finally, behind the doors (inaudible) have said, was there any conversation between U.S. and China, U.S. and Pakistan, on this deal, if they had expressed any disappointment or anything other than what we’ve heard publicly?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, the Indian Government decided to move forward with this in the middle of the summer, and so we had to compress into a very short timeframe what normally should have taken a much longer period of time to get done.

So we conducted quite a lot of very intensive diplomacy with the IAEA Board of Governors countries, and also with the Nuclear Suppliers Group countries, including, as you know, during the Nuclear Suppliers Group meetings [in Vienna]. And so both countries were part of that discussion. We spent a lot of time talking to both countries and to a lot of other countries, too.

So yeah, there was conversation between the United States and both countries, but frankly, with a lot of other countries in both the Board and the NSG about what we saw as the merits of a very good deal, not just for both countries but for the world.

QUESTION: When do you expect the remaining certifications to be completed?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, there are two phases of certification. So the first phase of certifications are the two that the bill specifies have to be done by the President before the exchange of diplomatic notes and entry into force of the agreement. One concerns NPT obligations of the United States, and the other one’s on enrichment and reprocessing technology. So those are at the White House, and I would expect that those will be done pretty soon – I’d say in the next week to ten days. I can’t give you a specific, but it’s basically a bureaucratic process.

QUESTION: Well, can you mention those two again, please?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Yeah. They’re in the bill. I mean, I – you can look at them in the bill. But one of them has to do with the – whether the Agreement is consistent with the NPT, which we believe it is. And the other has to do with American policy globally toward the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies: that’s something that the President, as you know, spoke to in his NDU speech in 2004.

So there are two certifications that you can see in the bill. And we’ve prepared those, and so it’s just a question of when the President signs. So I would expect that’s going to happen pretty quickly, in due course.

And there are two additional certifications that have to take place prior to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission giving licenses. So that would be after entry into force of the agreement, but prior to the NRC granting licenses. But one of those concerns entry into force of India’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA – and by the way, that’s not just for us, but for anybody that wants to do trade with safeguarded facilities in India; you would have to have entry into force of the agreement, so we’re looking forward to that. And then you may have noticed there’s another certification in the bill [prior to NRC licensing] regarding a declaration by India, which is in the Safeguards Agreement to the IAEA – that it not be materially inconsistent with the Separation Plan. And so when India moves forward with the IAEA declaration, we’ll hopefully be in a position to make that certification as well. But these are things that will happen in due course.

QUESTION: The safeguards that you are referring to, is this in the Additional Protocol?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: No. This is the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement that was negotiated prior to the Board of Governors’ approval. The Additional Protocol is something separate that’s happening between India and the IAEA. And as we’ve always said, this actually is one of the Hyde Act certifications that we had to make to Congress – that India and the IAEA were making substantial progress on an Additional Protocol. So quite apart from entry into force of the [nuclear] agreement, obviously we would very much welcome conclusion of an Additional Protocol. And I understand that there have been, you know, several rounds of negotiation between India and the Director General and the Secretariat of the IAEA. So that process is proceeding apace as well. That’s my understanding.

QUESTION: So it at least may take a few months?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, I’ll leave that to my Indian colleagues to say. But I would expect that the Safeguards Agreement would enter into force fairly soon – because it’s not just a question of certification, it’s a question of conducting nuclear trade internationally. It’s not just the United States; I think for all countries that intend to conduct nuclear trade with safeguarded facilities, you would have to have a safeguards agreement that had entered into force. But that’s something between India and the IAEA – but when that happens, we’ll then make the certification to Congress.

QUESTION: But these certifications are then – are – will be certified by the President only already signed by India?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: I don’t understand what you mean by “signed by India”?

QUESTION: The certifications signed on is – maybe it’s certified only by the President.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Yeah. This is domestic – this is domestic law within the United States. So the bill that was passed by Congress and then signed by the President is American law. And so the President, according to the law that Congress passed and he signed, has to make certain certifications to the Congress. So that’s our domestic process. But he’s certifying things that will have happened between, for instance, India and the IAEA.

QUESTION: So India has already accepted this letter that the President is going to sign or certify?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, it’s not a question of that. I mean, India has negotiated a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, so obviously India will look to bring its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA into force. When India and the IAEA, quite apart from the United States, bring the Safeguards Agreement into force, then the United States, as part of its process, will be in a position to make an Executive Branch certification to the Legislative Branch. But that’s on the basis of the law.

QUESTION: All right. Do these certifications have to proceed – proceed the – what is called the negotiations between U.S. companies and Indian companies that they are going to – (inaudible) in December? Would that be (inaudible?)

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, as I said, there were two separate baskets of certifications, and I’d encourage you to take a look at the bill because you can see the language of the bill very specifically. So, two certifications are prior to exchange of diplomatic notes and entry into force of the 123 Agreement that we’ve signed. The other two certifications are prior to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States granting licenses. So there are two discrete phases of this. And, you know, one concerns the diplomatic mechanics of bringing the Agreement into force, as we have to do with any agreement. The other has to do with licenses. So you know, all of these certifications will have to be completed. Because to engage in nuclear trade, we’d have to have an agreement that had entered into force, and the NRC would have to be in a position to grant the licenses.

QUESTION: Before the industry group traveling to India in December, so it should be done before that?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: I don’t – I don’t know. It’ll be done when it’s done. But –

QUESTION: Yeah, I mean, hopefully.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, we have a signed agreement. And there’s no reason why we wouldn’t expect industry to have a conversation. So –

QUESTION: So precisely, at what point does the 123 Agreement enter into force?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: When the United States and India exchange diplomatic notes bringing it into force. And we will exchange diplomatic notes after the President has made these certifications. And as I said, those certifications are in train and I expect that to happen probably in the next week to ten days. But I don’t want to give you a hard and fast number, because you’ll come back to me in a week and you’ll say, “you said it was a week” – so it’ll happen in due course. I don’t see any obstacles.

QUESTION: And if institutionally, when new President comes in, how much of what this President has said passes on institutionally to the next administration of the next President? Is it bound by the other guarantee that this President has made?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, the bill has now – the President signed this bill into law, so you know – so the 123 Agreement is a – that’s an agreement that the United States and India have reached. And the next administrations in both countries will inherit the 123 Agreement. Senator Obama and Senator McCain were both very strong supporters of this agreement. And as you know, Senator Biden played a very important role also on this agreement. So I would expect that the next administration, whoever it may be, will be a big supporter of the U.S.-India relationship, and also of nuclear trade between the United States and India.

QUESTION: The language of the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement gave the impression that the Additional Protocol was necessary before all this happened. Why is it that nobody is talking anymore concretely about the Additional Protocol?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, I mean, the first thing I’d say about an Additional Protocol is, as you know, we had to make a certification by law under the Hyde Act, to Congress that India and the IAEA were making substantial progress on an Additional Protocol. And the President so certified. So it’s our judgment, it’s the President’s judgment, that substantial progress has been made.

The next challenge, and I think India and the IAEA are continuing along this course, is to complete one. So they’ll have to discuss the text, and there’ll be exchanges between the Director General—and the Secretariat—and India, and we’ve encouraged that process. And Congress encouraged that process – it’s actually in, I think, Section 103 of the bill. There’s language welcoming the possibility of concluding an Additional Protocol – welcoming is not the word, so maybe encouraging an Additional Protocol. But substantial progress has been made. And so it’s not that it’s dropped off the radar screen. I mean, we made this certification as recently as September 10. It’s just that it’s something that the IAEA and India are going to have to complete. So it’s something that we’re going to watch closely, and we encourage. But ultimately, that’s a negotiation between India and the IAEA.

QUESTION: So, in a way, from the American side, the (inaudible) more between 2005 and 2008 in the sense that it was no longer necessary to conclude the Additional Protocol, only substantial progress?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: No, you’re mixing apples and oranges. The language of the Hyde Act and the certification that we had to make was substantial progress. That’s the apple. (Laughter.) The orange is: we’d like to see India and the IAEA conclude an Additional Protocol.

QUESTION: You know, what I was referring to is the Joint Statement 2005.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: No. But we’d like to see the IAEA and India conclude an Additional Protocol, and they’ve made substantial progress toward that end. So that’s a good thing. The only issue for September 10 was that the President had to make a certification that Congress had asked for in the Hyde Act. And so that’s been done.

So I’m not sure I understand your premise. I mean, I think – we’ve certified substantial progress has been made and we look forward to the conclusion of an Additional Protocol. And I know that the Director General does too. And so does India, for that matter –otherwise, they wouldn’t be conducting this negotiation.

QUESTION: To get back to what may happen once a new President takes office, now President Bush’s signed statement seemed to be to many observers (inaudible). Many of the statements made by his officials to Congress. Will the next President be bound by the signed statement or by the letter of the (inaudible) legislation?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, first I would – I don’t accept the premise that the President’s remarks were at variance with what U.S. officials have said. I think they’re all consistent. And second, as I said, Senator Obama and Senator McCain are supporters of the 123 Agreement, and so is Senator Biden. There were overwhelming bipartisan majorities [for the bill]. So I would expect that there’s a lot of bipartisan support for nuclear trade between the United States and India.

So you know, as I said at the very beginning when I was trying to set the context, this is a relationship between the United States and India that enjoys very broad bipartisan support. And you only need to look at the things that Senator Dodd said on the floor and Senator Lugar said on the floor, and since then. And both Senator Dodd and Senator Lugar come from different political parties. I mean, there’s a lot of support for nuclear trade. So I can only speak for this Administration, I can’t speak for the next administration, but there’s a lot of support for this relationship and for this agreement. So you know, that’s the context.

QUESTION: You know, what is the – sort of, final word on this distinction between political commitments and legally binding commitments?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Oh, God. You know, I have nothing to say about that that hasn’t been said already. This has been rehashed and hashed and hashed over and over again. So I think you’ve heard what we have to say about that and –

QUESTION: You still (inaudible) keep us in business. (Laughter.)

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Yeah. And you guys – what are you guys doing to do without the Civil Nuclear Agreement? (Laughter.) Yeah, I know the reasons. I know the reasons. You guys will be so bored. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: There’s a presumption that the whole nonproliferation lobby will be back in action and back at work. (Inaudible) democracy and that. But there are parts of this agreement, which are still considered to be (inaudible) in nature. And in a Democratic administration, where the nonproliferation guys have a very strong say (inaudible), look, these are political commitments, these are not legal commitments. All that – you know, for instance the fuel guarantees, the (inaudible.) So there’s a lot of stuff still open and there’s always the sense that the future Administration could – couldn’t go along as smoothly as visualized under the Republicans.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Yeah. I have no doubt that you guys are going to continue writing stories again and again about the civil nuclear initiative, even after we’ve completed the civil nuclear initiative. But I have nothing. As I said, I have nothing to add beyond what’s been said about this already.

QUESTION: All right. Can we move to our next favorite subject?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Sure.

QUESTION: Pakistan? (Laughter.) De-hyphenated.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Yeah, it’s been de-hyphenated. It’s the best thing that ever happened.

QUESTION: But the fact of the matter is, seriously, what kind of conversations are happening between India and U.S. about a potential Pakistani meltdown, since the blowback will be almost immediate for India?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: That’s not something I’m in a position to really comment on. I think, you know, the United States and India have a very robust conversation about all kinds of subjects, including things globally, things regionally. I’m the Deputy Assistant Secretary that handles India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries but not Pakistan, so it doesn’t figure in my conversations. But I talk to the Indian Government about all kinds of things, including, you know, Mr. Prachanda and Nepal, and Sri Lanka. And so – so anyway, we have a pretty robust conversation about South Asia, as we always have – and as we do with Pakistan, for that matter.

Is that – is that the “next favorite subject”? (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Okay. So going back to another aspect of (inaudible) I just wanted to look at (inaudible). We frequently hear reports about prosecution, you know, some scientists offering (inaudible) or any number of (inaudible) on some nonproliferation charges. I believe there’s one case in North Carolina. There was probably one in Hawaii. And I keep wondering promoting the (inaudible) and you talk to a lot of – it seems to be many of this appears based on charges involving not really high-tech (inaudible). This is stuff you can actually (inaudible) is you can get in an Office Depot or, you know, Staples. And I wonder whether this whole business of prosecuting nonproliferation violations is a Justice Department initiative. Does the State [Department] get into it at all? Do they run it by you? Does the nonproliferation (inaudible) involved in it, or is it purely a function of FBI, Justice and their –

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: I don’t mean to dodge you on this, but it’s not something that I really have a lot of expertise on. Legal issues and prosecutions are the purview of the Justice Department, so I’d just refer you to those or –

QUESTION: No, no. My question is whether they run it by State at all?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Well, there’s an interagency process for all kinds of things.

QUESTION: Because it seems to me that here, you know, the sort of big ticket items being discouraged, you know. Somebody – some guy is getting prosecuted for –

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: There’s an interagency process. But law enforcement is the purview of Justice. Law – we don’t do law enforcement at State, but we do do diplomatic relations. So there’s an interagency process.

QUESTION: So does it mean they run it by you?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: I’d have to get you the answer on, you know, who’s responsible for exactly what. But law enforcement and those legal issues are the purview of the Justice Department. But as on many issues, there’s always an interagency process.

QUESTION: What do you expect will be the fallout of all that’s happening in the economy on – in the U.S. economic relations?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: I don’t know. I mean, I think it’s interesting that the decoupling debate has fallen away a little bit. You know, there was this interesting debate about “decoupling” for years and years. And I don’t hear people talking about decoupling quite as much as they used to.

So on the one hand, it shows how interconnected the global economy really is. And on the other hand, it demonstrates why we have, really, a shared stake in getting things right on a global level in terms of the trade round and other things.

So there’s a pretty robust economic conversation, and a financial conversation, between the U.S. and India. There’s the Financial and Economic Forum, Trade Policy Forum, CEO Forum, High Technology Cooperation Group. There’s a lot of conversation. And I expect that, you know, there’ll be a lot for the financial policymakers to talk about. But what’s struck me, personally, the most about it is how interconnected the markets are.

QUESTION: Have you – have you heard of anyone in State (inaudible) the old CTBT in anticipation of the change in presidency and new Congress?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: I don’t know what the next administrations are thinking about.

QUESTION: But you know when the –

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: I don’t know what Senator Obama – I can’t read Senator Obama and Senator McCain’s minds.

QUESTION: The U.S. Government – sorry. What do you think will be after (inaudible) of business on this civil-nuclear deal?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: (Laughter.)

QUESTION: What do you think would be the next major step? You know, what – is it going to be terrorism, is it going to be what?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: I think – this may sound a little bit abstract, but I think it’s really – I call it “going global.” It’s building a more global relationship between the United States and India.

You know, I started by saying that if you go back 12 or 13 years, then India wasn’t such a big factor in American strategic thinking. And frankly, I’m not sure America was such a big factor in Indian strategic thinking either. So the first phase was really to transform that relationship. The second thing was to get the relationship—and the conversation—to explode the boundaries of South Asia a little bit: so we’re not just talking about South Asia, but we’re talking about issues that affect both countries on a global scale and issues that have global implications.

I think, as I said at the beginning, what’s happened with American foreign policy is we’ve adapted ourselves increasingly to the fact that there are a whole variety of global challenges that the United States just needs to find a way to work with India on. And I think India is adapting itself to that too. So, you know, you go down the list: Conclude a successful trade round? The U.S. and India have to find a way to work together. Deal with climate change? The U.S. and India have to find a way to work together. And there are a whole other series of things on the list.

So these are global problems. They’re not American problems. They’re not Indian problems. But they’re problems on which the United States and India don’t really have historically a track record of cooperation. But we’ve laid the platform over the last decade or so, and particularly over the last four or five years, to really work on these things.

So I think the challenge is threefold: One is to think more globally about what the United States and India can do together – that it’s not just a bilateral relationship or a regional relationship but that, intellectually, we’re thinking about this as a more global partnership.

The second thing is to turn common interests into complementary policies, which is not always the easiest thing to do. You know, when I look around the world, whether it’s in Africa, or it’s in East Asia, or it’s in the Gulf, or it’s on these global challenges like energy security or concluding a trade round, the United States and India, on the face of it, have a lot of common interests. But we’ve only begun in recent years to try to turn these common interests into complementary policies. And so that’s the kind of thing that I think that the two Administrations that are going to come into office [in each country] over the next six or seven months are going to have to try to do more of.

And then the third thing I’d say is, we need to have a much more global conversation in the way we talk to each other. In my career, I’ve worked on a lot of big relationships that the United States has. I’ve worked on the U.S.-China relationship. I’ve worked on the U.S.-Japan relationship. Historically, I think the U.S.-India conversation is probably the least global of those conversations.

I’ll just give you an example: Our Assistant Secretary for Africa, Jendayi Frazer, was in China the other day conducting a U.S.-China consultation on Africa. So there’s absolutely no reason that the United States and India shouldn’t find a way to conduct a conversation on Africa or on the Gulf or on East Asia, to try to compare notes, take stock of things, maybe try to concert policies where we can. And we’re not going to agree on everything, but we have a lot of common interests. So turning common interests into complementary policies means you have to find a way, structurally, to have that kind of conversation.

So I think, you know, my advice to the people that succeed me—you know, succeed Boucher and succeed the Secretary and others—is that they ought to look at the U.S.-India relationship through a more global prism than I think we have over the last 10 or 15 years – that the table is laid for that.

You know, with the civil nuclear initiative, we’ve cleared away a big obstacle to a more strategic relationship with the two countries. But also, we’re at a point in history where both countries, I think, are thinking about their interests and equities globally. And so the first thing we ought to do is find a way to make the conversation a little bit more global, but second, look around the world and see what we can do together. And that means, you know, looking at what embassies can do together in the field, comparing notes – but ultimately try to work together jointly to [find] solutions to some of these kinds of challenges. So for me, that’s the next thing: it’s building a more global partnership between the U.S. and India.

MODERATOR: I think we have time for one more question.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: Sure.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) also. How often did India and China come up in (inaudible) with each of (inaudible) in the U.S. talks with China and the U.S. talks with India?

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FEIGENBAUM: A lot. I think – you know, I said that we’re paying a lot more attention to India because of these changes globally and also because of these changes bilaterally – Indian-American business. But I think we’re also looking at India as an Asian country and not just a South Asian country these days. And I think that’s going to be true of the next administration, too.

There’s a notion that I particularly have – maybe it’s because of my background: I was an East Asia guy, I became a Central Asia guy, now I’m a South Asia guy. You know, if you look historically, for a thousand years from the sixth century to the sixteenth century, Asia was a very interconnected space – East, Central and South. And for the last two or three hundred years, that’s not always been the case. And I can’t show you this with economic data, but I can see it – I can show it to you anecdotally: When you travel around the region, you can see, I think, in a lot of ways, Asia—East, Central and South—becoming a much more integrated space, certainly strategically and potentially over time economically. So whether it’s India with its “Look East” policy, or India becoming part of the East Asia Summit, or India being in the ASEAN Regional Forum, or the possibility of Indian membership in APEC after the moratorium expires in 2010, whether it’s China becoming more active economically in Central Asia – Asia is becoming more integrated. So we’re increasingly looking at India as an actor in a wider Asian space. And I think we look at China the same way.

So in a way, it’s hard to just look at East, Central and South Asia discretely. You have to look at Asia and you have to think about American interests in this larger Asian setting.

But also, I’d say, frankly, the relationship between India, China and Japan—these three big Asian powers—how they manage their relations, the things they agree on, the things they disagree on: that’s going to shape the future in Asia, and the future of American policy in this part of the world, in a lot of different ways.

So we talk to India about China a lot. We’ve talked to China about South Asia, including India. And that’s a completely natural thing because, frankly, we have a lot of common interests on these things, too – the United States, India, China. Take something like energy. We’re big energy consumers. So for all the talk about energy competition, actually, the U.S., India, Japan and China have nearly identical interests: low price, secure supply, expanded supply, diversification into alternatives and renewables. We have common interests, but we don’t always have complementary policies.

So I think it’s quite a natural part of the conversation. And people sometimes assert that China is the reason that the United States and India are improving their relations. But I can think of 63 good reasons the U.S. and India should have improved their relationship a long time ago that have nothing to do with China. So I won’t deny that China’s in the background, but it’s not the principal factor. And I don’t think it’s unnatural that it’s part of the conversation.

Again, I think this is a decade-long process of adaptation in all three countries. So yeah, the short answer is yes – it’s part of the conversation, but it’s a very dynamic and interesting conversation.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you for joining us today.