The Six-Party Talks

MR. BOOKBINDER: Good morning and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center. Welcome also to our journalists gathered in New York at the New York Foreign Press Center. We are pleased this morning to welcome Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. And Ambassador Hill will focus on the six-party talks. That's the purpose for the briefing. Ambassador Hill will make some opening remarks and then we'll go to Q&A.

Ambassador Hill.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Joe, thank you very much. I know that you heard a lot about the six-party talks. Some of you were even in Beijing. I recognize a couple of faces here. So perhaps I'll just limit my comments just to a couple and I'll go right to questions.

Obviously, thirteen days is a long time. It's especially a long time to come away without an agreement. On the other hand, it followed 13 months in which there were no sessions at all, so in a certain respect, we had to spend those 13 days trying to catch up and making sure we all knew each other's positions.

I would say they were very good discussions, very businesslike discussions, with a minimum of polemics on anyone's part. We really tried to focus on the way forward. We tried to focus on trying to reach an agreement on principles so that we could use those principles to shape the way ahead and try to reach an agreement as early as September. We're hoping that if we can get through these principles, we can get going with an actual agreement in September or at the latest October and see if we can finally put this terrible problem to bed.

I would say, as a general comment, that the first few days were an effort to talk through the differences. The next few days were an effort to get something down on paper. There were times when I thought we might actually get there, but as it turned out, we were not able to agree on a number of issues. I know you've heard what some of those are. I'm not, at this point, ready to say which were the deal-breakers and which were not because nothing is agreed unless all is agreed. And so I think I'll be in a much better position to do that once we actually have an agreement and then we can go back and I can tell you what we felt were the real sticking points.

Obviously, light-water reactor is something that came up at the end and would be problematic, but I don't want to put the entire onus on that. I'd say though there was a real effort by all the parties to try to negotiate seriously and negotiate with the aim to reach an agreement, so I was kind of encouraged by that sort of attitude in the talks.

And all the parties, all six, agreed to come back during the week of August 29th. I must say, after 13 days of this, the last thing you want to do is sit down again and do it some more, but I think everyone was very much in the mood that there was progress there and this was well worth continuing at. I know I felt that way.

So we'll see. We'll see how we do when we get back on the week of the 29th. So that was sort of opening comments. Why don't I go to your questions?

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Let's go with Russia, in the second row.

QUESTION: Ivan Lebedev, Russian News Agency-TASS. Mr. Ambassador, I would appreciate if you help us to clarify the overall U.S. approach to one of the key issues at the negotiations and tell us if you think that North Korea should dismantle entirely all its nuclear program or can they retain the right to develop nuclear energy in peaceful purposes and have their civilian part of its nuclear program, in compliance with the NPT and under the supervision of IAEA.

AMBASSADOR HILL: You have put your finger on an important issue. It's our view that they do need to dismantle all their programs. This is a country that had trouble keeping peaceful energy "peaceful" and if you recall that Youngbyun was a research reactor, described as a scientific research reactor, described as a reactor that was producing some electricity and yet after the collapse of the Agreed Framework, within days the DPRK had expelled the inspectors, pulled out of the NPT, the Nonproliferation Treaty, expelled the inspectors and then within a couple of months, were actually using this peaceful reactor to produce a weapons grade plutonium. So there's a track record there that needs to be dealt with.

I would also like to focus on the fact that the overall agreement is designed to give incentives to DPRK not to need to develop nuclear energy. For example, the South Koreans, the Republic of Korea, came forward with a rather robust proposal, a very serious proposal indeed, to provide energy, provide electricity in really the near term. I mean, we're talking two and half, three years, maximum. I mean, this is a very -- this would be a program that would get online very rapidly and provide a substantial, substantial amount of electricity that can meet a lot of the needs for the DPRK.

So the concern is that it seems that we should focus on those issues, focus on the economic issues, the energy issues that they need, focus on dismantling and getting out of the nuclear weapons business, focus on getting back into the NPT.

And so it seems that to be talking about retaining a right of peaceful use at this point seems like the wrong subject. I mean, they should be focusing on what they need to do to get out of this weapons business, get into the business of providing electricity to their citizens. North Korea is one of the darkest countries, in terms of electricity. I mean, that they have -- so much of their capacity is offline because it's just not functioning. It just seems they ought to work on that and not work so much on the issue of downstream right to nuclear energy.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Might I ask that you limit yourselves to one question. And we can go in the fourth row to KBS. We'll go to Korea.

QUESTION: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILL: KBS.

QUESTION: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILL: KBS.

QUESTION: Yes. Kyung Min from KBS. Korean Broadcasting System.

AMBASSADOR HILL: I know them well. (Laughter).

QUESTION: The South Korean Government proposed that it will provide electricity to North Korea along -- before the fourth round of six-party talks resumed. Either proposal helped the North -- South Korean delegates to have leverage in negotiating power or even the United States leverage, vis-à-vis North Korea, during this last round of six-party talks?

AMBASSADOR HILL: I don't know if I want to talk about leverage because we'll know about leverage after we have an agreement. The purpose of leverage is to move something and we'll know that the DPRK has moved when we see an agreement.

But I will tell you, I'll tell you very honestly, very seriously, the ROK delegation was very, very active. I mean they were busy. They had lots of meetings. They're meeting with us daily. They had meetings with the DPRK. They were very busy with the Chinese -- a very, very serious effort from the ROK delegation. They came with some proposals, notably the energy proposal. They had done their homework and they were full participants.

And for me, it was kind of a good reminder of why we need a six-party process because for people who think this is a U.S.-DPRK problem, they ought to think again. They ought to look at the interest the other countries have in resolving it. And none was more clear than with the ROK, which has a great interest in resolving this and consequently brings a lot to the table.

So the era when, you know, ROK diplomats would kind of wait outside the door to get the results, that era's over and the ROK they're in the door and they're at the table. So I think that's a very good sign for the ROK.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Good. We'll go to Japan in the fourth row.

QUESTION: Michael Lavallee from TBS, Tokyo Broadcasting System. Yesterday, Kim Gye Gwan again said that the nuclear -- that North Korea deserved to have a nuclear reactor and that it was a very legitimate demand on their part. The few days since the talks only has seemed to harden their position on that. The U.S. is still saying that, you know, that that's not something that would be allowed under any agreement.

Is there any room -- what I'm wondering is there any room for any flexibility here at all? Under any condition would the U.S. be willing to accept the situation that a reactor could be built in North Korea or is this an absolute deal-breaker if North Korea maintains this position?

And in addition to that, I was wondering if there was any discussion by North Korea at the talks that if a reactor was allowed would they allow the inspectors back in at the same time?

AMBASSADOR HILL: One thing people need to realize is this -- we are still in the fourth session. I mean we have a three-week recess for people to go back to capitals and have some discussions and sort of have some exchange between the actual negotiating delegations and the governments. And I think it is very important, especially for the DPRK team to get back to Pyongyang and have some in-depth discussion about what could follow.

I don't think it serves any useful purpose for me to be talking about the U.S. position or any dynamics in the U.S. position in the future.

I think what's important is to focus people on the fact that there is a very good deal on the table. It involves a lot of energy; an energy deal that will meet DPRK needs for some time. It's an energy deal that will be online pretty quickly.

There was discussion on light-water reactor and I noticed the press picked up on that, but maybe you all did not pick up enough on the fact that no one's building a light-water reactor. These are rather expensive things. We're talking billions of dollars so that's not happening and so we're dealing with some very, very specific things. We're dealing with getting people's lights turned on and rather than talk about the theoretical sources of power, it would be better to talk about how you're going to get those lights on.

I know that the chief North Korean delegate, Kim Gye Gwan, had some comments in Pyongyang. I'm having comments. A lot of people are having comments. I think we're all very much resolved to come back on the week of the 29th and see what we can do.

I know their position; they know our position. Different delegations have positions. Everyone is of the position -- there are five delegations that are clearly of a position, and we're not talking light-water reactors because no one's going to build a light-water reactor. But we're still in a negotiation.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. We're going to go to New York for a question. New York, please go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi, this is Julie Norwell from The Oriental Economist. Ambassador Hill, I'd like to know whether you think the Japanese election in September is going to affect the six-party talks at all? And if so, how?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, you should ask someone from the Japanese delegation that question. First of all, we are in very close contact with the Japanese delegation. I met with Ken Sasae, my friend and colleague in this, several times a day. We're in very good synch on what we need to do and I know there's an election in Japan but it doesn't mean there isn't going to be a government in Japan. So I'm sure we can continue to work very closely together and I'm sure there will be real continuity in what we need to get done.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay, we'll go to Hong Kong in the second row.

QUESTION: Naichian Mo from Phoenix Television of Hong Kong. My first question, did North Korea deny they have enrichment programs in this round of talks?

And second, in your previous Congressional testimony, you stated that China hadn't done enough to bring its best friend back to the negotiation and reach a deal. So is there anything China could have done differently in this round of talks to bring out the necessary concession from North Korea?

AMBASSADOR HILL: I believe my comment on the Chinese in the Congressional or the Senate testimony was that China has a range of leverage because they are the major economic partner, a major political partner and they have chosen not to use all of their leverage, I think, was the way I put it.

China has a great interest in achieving this agreement. As host of the process, they really want to get this agreement. In fact, the Chinese delegation was very active. They put together some four drafts. The fourth draft was one that five delegations were pretty comfortable with. The DPRK delegation had some concerns about part of it. But I think the Chinese worked very, very hard.

I think we would look to them. We look to all delegations to do all that they feel they can to try to wrap up this issue. It's a tough issue. DPRK's been engaged in these programs for 20, 30 years. It's not easy for them to make the decision. It's the right decision, but sometimes even the right decision takes a while to arrive at.

And what was it -- there was a second part of that question.

Oh, yes, we had a good discussion. We had a very, very clear discussion with the DPRK delegation on that. And rather than tell you what their answers were on the specific parts of it, I will say that there was a very strong agreement that this issue does need to be solved to everyone's satisfaction and that was something the DPRK subscribed to.

So again, we're in a middle of a negotiation. This is not the end of round four, it's simply a recess, so I don't want to get too specific on these issues, except to say we had an excellent discussion on that issue.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Let's go to Korea up front in the first row, please. Thank you.

QUESTION: Hello, Ambassador. It seems to me that North Korea’s demand of peaceful use of nuclear energy is not a time target right now. As you mentioned, North Korea's nuclear arms dismantling is the most important issue right now. If North Korea showed its willingness to dismantle a nuclear arms program, why don't you accept it? Why don't you focus on that issue instead of the peaceful use of nuclear energy of North Korea?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Oh, you don't think I was focused on the abandoning of nuclear weapons and you didn't think I worried about that or --

QUESTION: I think -- if they showed the willingness to dismantle the nuclear arms program in the Beijing, why don't you focus on that issue, how to dismantle, how to assist to -- how to --

AMBASSADOR HILL: Yeah. Well, first of all, I want to assure you I focused on that like a laser. I really focused on that issue. That issue is very important. But what's also important is we don't want this problem to reemerge in a couple of years. We want to focus also on the comprehensive effort that will get the DPRK in the right direction, get it opening up to the world, get the world opening up to it.

We felt it was very important to focus on getting rid of these nuclear weapons. We felt it was maybe less important to focus on, you know, their eventual -- their desire to return to the status of a nuclear energy producer. So I can assure you our focus was on the abandonment of their weapons programs.

Don't assume -- and I really have to caution you on this -- don't assume that this one issue of so-called "civilian use" is the only issue out there. And also don't assume that, as it's been portrayed in the media, that these negotiators, like myself, have somehow just not understood that the real issue was getting rid of nuclear weapons. Believe me, we have it all, and I just want to stress that none of these issues is agreed unless all of them are agreed, so we have a lot of issues in the air that we need to pull together. It's not an easy thing to do. And for that reason, when the DPRK wanted to have a recess and talk to their capital, that reflected really a seriousness of intention. And their willingness to come back is also very important.

So I understand what you're trying to say, but believe me, we know about this thing, these issues and we're trying to put it together in a package that I think will serve the DPRK, serve the regions, serve all our interests.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Let's go to Japan in the front row please.

QUESTION: My name is Yukio Kashiyama. I'm with a Japanese newspaper, Sankei. Mr. Secretary, you said in the opening statement that all parties agreed to come back to the next session. I'm wondering how did you make sure that North Korean people are coming back to the next session? Did they promise to the United States in face-to-face meeting or did they promise to the Chinese people?

AMBASSADOR HILL: You mean sign their names in blood or something? (Laughter.) It's really quite simple actually. The Chinese are the hosts and they, in the last plenary session, they laid out some dates and there was a discussion about the dates. And the DPRK delegation came in and we all had a discussion about it and they supported the dates. And then there was a discussion, should you try to give a date or should you try to give a date and a week of a date, that is, the week of the 29th as opposed trying to shoehorn it into Monday the 29th. And everyone agreed to go with the week of the 29th.

I would say one of things that surprised me was there was a lot of discussion that somehow there would be this very difficult atmosphere in these talks that people would be shouting and things like that. I didn't have that at all. I think that our encounters with the DPRK when we met with them bilaterally many times, we met with them multilaterally, then we had a dinner, a working dinner with the DPRK delegation -- I found it really businesslike. And I take that as a good sign that there's a real desire to make some progress on this.

And I said, we are willing to stay with this thing as long as there is progress and we felt that there was progress and we're looking forward to the end of the recess. Actually, I hope to take a little vacation so I'm not looking forward to ending that quite so soon, but we're looking forward to getting back on the week of the 29th.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Let's see, we will go to the gentleman in pink.

QUESTION: Thank you, Ambassador. I'm Hiyoshi Inoue, TV Asahi, Japanese TV network. My question is about Japanese abduction issue. Did you propose the (inaudible) of human rights issue, especially Japanese abductees in bilateral talks. If you did, could you tell us the response from DPRK?

AMBASSADOR HILL: You know, it'll be much easier if you just entered the Diplomatic Service, get on to your country's delegation and just sat there and, you know, skip the middle man here. No, I can't tell you about all that stuff. (Laughter). But I can tell you that obviously the abduction issue, missile issue, this is a main concern -- one of the main concerns of the Japanese delegation, which was very articulate in explaining why this issue is important and why they need some mechanisms with the DPRK to deal with this.

So we understand why the Japanese need to deal with this issue. We understand they need a proper mechanism to deal with the DPRK and we support that. So I can't tell you that this was resolved. I can't tell you that we know precisely how it's going to be handled. There was a bilateral between the Japanese and DPRK immediately at the end of the meetings on the 13th day. So I think everyone understands the importance of this and we're going to try to figure out a mechanism -- and I keep saying "mechanism" because some of these things need to be solved in different channels, you know, some of them need to be solved in bilateral channels and we are very sympathetic to the fact that the Japanese have not been able to address this adequately through proper channels. So I would say, just to reiterate, the Japanese delegation was really quite impressive in how it addressed these issues. And I think everyone understands that there has to be some means put together to deal with that.

MR. BOOKBINDER: We'll go to the second row, gentleman on the end.

QUESTION: Thank you. Kin-ming Liu from Hong Kong's Apple Daily. Mr. Ambassador, do you find your Chinese counterpart has been pushing their North Korean friends as hard as you have been? And if so, do you think any other things the Chinese could have done or which they still can do to help in this process?

AMBASSADOR HILL: What I can tell you is the Chinese have a great interest in solving this. They understand that having a country like the DPRK producing nuclear weapons is a big problem for China, it's a big problem for the region, it's a big problem for the proliferation regime not only in Northeast Asia but, frankly speaking, throughout the world. It really raises enormous problems for the NPT and for the whole IAEA safeguards. And China is very much in the overall system and understands this problem very well.

I would say the Chinese spent a lot of time working to get the North Koreans to see the issue differently. I'm not going to stand here telling you what the Chinese need to do or what leverage they need to employ, but I will say that we all need to do all that we can, all that we can, with the understanding that different countries have different levels that they can address this with. But we need to solve this problem. It's a serious problem. It won't go away on its own. We need to solve it.

And so, I've said before that we have a lot of options for solving it, but the one option we don't have is just to walk away and pretend it doesn't exist. We need to solve it and the Chinese understand that better than anybody.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay, we'll go to Korea here.

QUESTION: Kiyon Kuk with the Segye Times, Korea.

When the South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young met North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, Chairman Kim said that North Korea will dismantle its intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range missiles if the United States established friendly relations with North Korea. So have you discussed North Korean missile issues at the talks and then, if so, are you asking North Korea to dismantle its missile program also?

AMBASSADOR HILL: We have made very clear that, first of all, we are prepared to begin the process -- I mean, it will take some time, but we're prepared to have normalized relations with the DPRK, subject to our bilateral policies and subject to, really, frankly, a dialogue with the DPRK. I think the DPRK understands that these programs, which are essentially an integrated program of trying to put nuclear weapons on a long-range missile, are, for us, a very, very big problem that we must solve.

We also are not very -- how to put it? -- we don't think the DPRK argument that they need these programs to deter the United States is quite accurate. We have said repeatedly that we recognize their sovereignty; we have absolutely no intention to attack or invade the DPRK. So we really don't believe that these programs are present to deter some kind of massive United States attack and this is why we have consistently made the point that this problem is not between the DPRK and us; it's between the DPRK, us and many other countries involved in the region. Their missiles are not necessarily ones that will reach, you know, the U.S., but they are definitely ones that pose serious concerns from their neighbors.

MR. BOOKBINDER: We'll go to the third row, the gentleman on the end.

QUESTION: Thomas Walde, ZDF German Television. Without giving away the deal-breakers, what do you think are the areas where you have made significant progress besides atmospherics, and what do you think are still the biggest obstacles between you and the other negotiating partners in reaching an agreement?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, we are trying to just lay out the set of principles that will guide our future discussion. We're trying to lay out the sort of programs that would be available to the DPRK, should it make that really fundamental decision to get out of this nuclear business.

We're prepared to deal with their energy needs, we're prepared to deal with their economic needs and we're prepared to deal with normalization, not only bilateral normalization, but international normalization that is getting them into international organizations in good standing, including international organizations that can in themselves help with their economic programs. So there's a pretty comprehensive list of issues that are on the table.

We had a very good discussion in the six-party context, but also in our direct meetings with the DPRK on these elements. And at one point I asked the DPRK, are there some elements that you want to see there, that you are not seeing there? And I was pleased that they, the DPRK delegates, felt that we're dealing with the right universe of issues. So I thought that was important.

And in short, as we looked at this document that the Chinese produced four versions of it, which I guess is not a lucky number in Chinese, but they were prepared to do a fifth, we could see that more or less, we were on the same page and that was encouraging. Now the DPRK does need to make the decision, that are they going to get out of this nuclear business.

They clearly, as you saw publicly, they are interested in light-water reactors. We have made the point that this agreement offers them the equivalent energy, exactly the equivalent energy. And so -- but they want light-water reactors and no one else wants them to have light-water reactors, or I should say, no one else is prepared to pay for them to have light-water reactors. So okay, there's a point of disagreement. But I wouldn't just single that out because sometimes in negotiations, you'll have issues, A, B and C and one side doesn't have a problem with C, but they'd prefer to say they have a problem with B, when really the problem is with C.

There are a lot of things that happened in these international organizations -- international negotiations, so I'd be a little careful about just reacting literally or to the comments, literal comments, of people like Mr. Kim Gye Gwan. But I would react if not to his words, then certainly to the music which is that his reactions in Pyongyang when he returned, I think it was on Tuesday were that they want to get back to the negotiations. He felt that they were -- he had positive things to say, so let's see how we do.

MR. BOOKDBINDER: Let's go to the gentleman who's standing, wearing the silver tie.

QUESTION: I'm from Future Korea Journal, a Korea newspaper.

MR. BOOKBINDER: You're from where?

QUESTION: Future Korea Journal. A Korean newspaper. It is well known that at the six-party talks which probably talk about their peace treaty for security assurance from North Korea. So my question is if North Korea is willing to dismantle their nuclear program and states it's ready to have (inaudible) start to negotiation, it (inaudible) on peace treaty with North Korea?

AMBASSADOR HILL: I think anyone who's looked at the situation in the Korean Peninsula or the fact that we're operating off of an armistice arrangement, I think anyone who looks at that, sees the value in trying to achieve some kind of peace treaty.

It's very important, though, that all the relevant players and, you know, I would say the world's tenth largest industrial country is a relevant player, that is the Republic of Korea. And so even though they weren't involved in signing the armistice, I think it's important that they be there for any potential, and I stress "potential," peace treaty negotiations.

Certainly, in the six-party process, it's important to keep a certain sense of ambition for the process. And while we do have to focus on the immediate issue at hand, that is getting the DPRK to abandon all its weapons systems, we should also keep in mind what needs to be done in the future in Northeast Asia to make it an area that will export more than just economic commodities, but also will be an area that is exporting security and good relations among neighbors.

And one of the things I'm hoping in the six-party process is to see better relations among different states in the region. I was a little disappointed that some countries had difficulties talking to each other in the course of the six-party process and I will not get more specific than that, but except to tell you that was not our problem. We talk to everybody.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Let's go to the third row, the gentlemen from Japan.

QUESTION: My name is Toshimitsu Sawai with Kyodo News, Japanese wire service. Yesterday in the interview with PBS, you said about the talks with North Korea, "I feel a very little sense of what's important to them. And from that I feel a little optimism because I think we can work something out, if I'm right about that." Could you elaborate on that? I mean, that what did you learn the important things for the North Koreans and how come you can be optimistic?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Here's the dilemma, if I tell you precisely the source of this optimism, there will be some news announcement somewhere, saying that I'm all wrong about that. And therefore, there will be no reason to be optimistic. So I tell you what, after we have a deal, I'll tell you what it was that made me feel good about it. (Laughter).

But really, nothing, nothing has been agreed because you -- every element, you know, different sides wanted different elements. And so you can't expect any one element to agree -- to be agreed unless all of the elements are agreed. So I felt there was a certain analytical framework that was helpful, that had looked sort of positive. But if I told you what the elements were, I'm sure there'll be some announcements somewhere and I'll be proven wrong. But after we get a deal, I'll come back to you and tell you what it was.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Let's see, the gentlemen in the front row.

QUESTION: Hi. I'm Yui with NHK, Japan.

AMBASSADOR HILL: I remember you. Yeah. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Yeah, I have a follow-up question on the missile issue and the human rights issue. Do you think that the missile issue and the human rights issue should be included in the statement of the principles, especially if the normalization is included in the statement? And you also just said that Chinese Government is prepared a fifth draft. So are you expecting a fifth draft when you go back to the Beijing?

AMBASSADOR HILL: I don't know if they're going to have a fifth draft. I think I was making a joke about the fact that four is an unlucky number, but you took it literally. I could see you writing it down right there. You got all excited about a fifth draft. But you just need to calm down. (Laughter.) And drink more tea and less coffee and you wouldn't have gone crazy about that fifth draft comment.

So I don't know. We'll see. I mean we have some outstanding issues and let's see if the Chinese want to come out with a draft. We've been very supportive of how they've been doing it. They've had very good consultations with us. As I said, we are very happy with the fourth draft. And I'd say five countries were very happy with a fourth draft.

As for as how to handle these issues, I would just say at this point they need to be handled. But I'm not going to tell you whether they have to be handled in a statement of principles or an agreement or in a bilateral instrument. But these are important issues for Japan. I was pleased that they were able to have a bilateral discussion about it at the end of the session there in Beijing. And so they do need to be handled but I don't think we need to talk about the specific piece of paper where they need to be handled.

MR. BOOKBINDER: I'd like to go to the woman in the fourth row here.

QUESTION: Dong Min Lee from Yonhap News Agency. You said that you are willing to meet North Korea bilaterally before the six-party talks --

AMBASSADOR HILL: We've been meeting them bilaterally. Why do you keep bringing that issue up? (Laughter).

QUESTION: But isn't it about time that you use some other channel than New York, something that North Korea could possibly read more into in terms of symbolism, the level? Maybe invite North Koreans to Washington?

AMBASSADOR HILL: I see. You're sort of a DPRK psychiatrist and you're telling me that that would make them feel better or something? Look, we have some pretty good channels. Let me kind of work on the substance of it. I think we had a lot of bilateral meetings with them. We'll do more meetings. We'll do whatever it takes really, in terms of meetings. And I think we all ought to focus on the issues here and not so much focus on the symbolism. I really think we've sort of checked the symbolism box.

And I think ultimately if we reach an agreement, not only the statement of principles but actually the full agreement, that will open up entire new roads for DPRK's relationships with the international community, including with the United States. So it's all out there. It's really all out there. It's all ahead of them so we can work on that.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Let's go to Great Britain in the sixth row.

QUESTION: I'm Paul Eckert from Reuters. I know you dealt with this on the Lehrer Report last night, but the Iran -- if you can mention -- if North Korea starts, for example, I don't want to be hypothetical, but if North Korea starts raising, well, Iran is getting support for a civilian nuclear program, why not us? North Korea, if they ask if they won't be the first to do so, what sort of answer do you have? How do you sort out those issues as a matter of policy?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, it is hypothetical because they haven't done it. Secondly, you know, again, I don't want to get into the Iran situation. It's not my brief. But, yes, we're dealing with a situation -- DPRK, where they had -- I mean I hate to repeat myself, but they had a research reactor. They kicked out the international inspectors. They pulled themselves out of the international agreement. They turned a research reactor, in two short months, into a weapons-producing machine. So that is a problem. That's a problem that I don't think has emerged in the Iran negotiations, although again, I don't want to get into that. I haven't -- I'm not the person dealing with that, but it's a big problem in our negotiations. It's a fact. It happened. We have to deal with facts. We have to deal with what happened.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. We'll go to Taiwan.

QUESTION: Hi, Ambassador. I'm Nadia Tsao from Taiwan, Liberty Times. One question when China's using its leverage to help this talk, some people always wonder where China used this as a tradeoff for U.S. concessions on China's position. I wonder if you can say is anything still -- you know, people should worry about.

And secondly, when you're using a carrot --

AMBASSADOR HILL: I'm using what?

QUESTION: Carrots to attract North Koreans back to the table to talk. We also know that the U.S. is using sticks, you know, like to strengthen, to crackdown their illegal activities like financial or the missile exports to outside of North Korea. So when you're talking with the North Korean will those, you know, sticks still work, if you still ask the neighboring countries to help U.S. to crack down on those illegal activities?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Yes. First of all, I've heard this issue about the tradeoff with Taiwan, but I've only heard it in the media. I have never, ever, and I've had numerous discussions with the Chinese about DPRK and the nuclear problem and we have never mixed up the Taiwan issue, although obviously we've talked about the Taiwan issue many times, but never in connection with the DPRK's nuclear programs, so I can put that to rest right now.

And with respect to "carrots and sticks," there are issues involving DPRK's illicit activities. These tend to be law enforcement issues; they've not been six-party issues. They're law enforcement issues. We've had concerns about certain exports and things like that and we work on those issues, but they're not part of the six-party process. So you talk about the carrots and sticks, we don't mix apples and oranges. (Laughter).

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. We'll go to the second row, gentleman.

QUESTION: Vladimir Kara-Murza, RTVI Television, Russia. Ambassador Hill, you mentioned normalization a few times today. How far would the United States be prepared to go in terms of normalization of relations with the DPRK? And what I'm asking is what is meant by "normalization" from the U.S. point of view?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, normalization is a process. It's a process involving a lot of bilateral instruments. It's a process that involves one's bilateral policies. But it's also a process that if this nuclear obstruction can be removed from the road, we can go pretty far on that road.

So I want to emphasize, this nuclear issue is a big, big problem for us. And if that big, big problem can be removed, I think we can go a long way, subject to those other points I just made.

We'll do one more.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Let's go to this gentleman right here.

QUESTION: Shin Kazama, Fuji Television, Japan. I'm just wondering if you feel you need a brand new position paper or a mandate when you are back in Beijing? And if so, at which level of the administration that should be approved?

AMBASSADOR HILL: You're trying to get at Washington politics, is that what you're -- (Laughter).

I had complete backing for what I was doing. I was very pleased with the support I had. We had a delegation that involved several different agencies, national security agencies, the National Security Council was on the delegation. We had people involved just with the nonproliferation issue, and then we had area experts. We had people from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which is from Rumsfeld's office. We had someone from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is from General Myers’, General Pace's office. So my delegation was really a sort of Washington microcosm, if you will. And I think we are really one team and one mission, so I felt a lot of support. And I think I've got all the support I need to try to get this deal, from our point of view. It takes more than one to tango, though.